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ABSTRACT
 
Non-governmental aid programs are an important source of  health
care for many people in the developing world. Despite the central
role non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play in the delivery of
these vital services, for the most part they either lack formal systems
of  accountability to their recipients altogether, or have only very weak
requirements in this regard. This is because most NGOs are both
self-mandating and self-regulating. What is needed in terms of
accountability is some means by which all the relevant stakeholders
can have their interests represented and considered. An ideally
accountable decision-making process for NGOs should identify
acceptable justifications and rule out unacceptable ones. Thus, the
point of  this paper is to evaluate three prominent types of  justification
given for decisions taken at the Dutch headquarters of  Médecins
sans Frontières. They are: population health justifications, mandate-
based justifications and advocacy-based justifications. The central
question at issue is whether these justifications are sufficiently
robust to answer the concerns and objections that various stake-
holders may have. I am particularly concerned with the legitimacy
these justifications have in the eyes of  project beneficiaries. I argue
that special responsibilities to certain communities can arise out of
long-term engagement with them, but that this type of  priority needs
to be constrained such that it does not exclude other potential
beneficiaries to an undesirable extent. Finally, I suggest several new
institutional mechanisms that would enhance the overall equity of
decisions and so would ultimately contribute to the legitimacy of  the
organization as a whole.
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INTRODUCTION
 
Non-governmental aid programs are an important
source of health care for many people in the devel-
oping world. In some areas, such programs are the
only source of medical treatment, while in others
they provide specific services meant to supplement
the existing health care options. Despite the central
role non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play
in the delivery of these vital services, for the most
part, they either lack formal systems of accountabil-
ity to their recipients altogether or have only very
weak requirements in this regard. In particular,
NGOs typically have complete discretionary power
over when and where to open, close, or implement
serious changes to programs. This is because the
majority  of  NGOs  are  both  self-mandating  and
self-regulating.
However, given what is at stake for the recipi-
ents (or patients) in this context, we might object
to this one-sided approach and instead maintain
that aid recipients in the developing world are
entitled to hold NGOs accountable for the deci-
sions they make. At the very least we can say
that they have a legitimate claim to be informed
of the justifications for decisions that may affect
them or their communities in a profound manner.
Additionally, we might suppose that they have a
legitimate claim to be able to appeal such deci-
sions and to have their interests represented dur-
ing deliberations. This is certainly a plausible
claim to make with respect to populations that
are currently receiving medical aid. It is also
worth noting that populations without adequate
access to medical care that are 
 
not yet served
 
 by
health-care NGOs also have a vital interest in the
outcome of such deliberations, and so it seems
that they may be entitled to make similar types
of claims.
Indeed, many NGOs are concerned about how
they might improve accountability to their benefi-
ciaries, but there is considerable disagreement
among them about how this concern ought to be put
into practice. This is reflected in a variety of self-
regulatory mechanisms that have been recently
proposed by (and for) NGOs. These mechanisms
include the guidelines set out in 
 
The Sphere Project:
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in
Disaster Response
 
1
 
 and the creation of a ‘humani-
tarian ombudsman’ who would represent the inter-
ests of aid beneficiaries.
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 Nevertheless, what 
 
is
 
 clear
is that in order to generate accountability what is
needed is some means by which all the relevant
stakeholders  can  have  their  interests  represented
and considered. Further, an ideally accountable
decision-making process for NGOs would have to
identify acceptable justifications and rule out unac-
ceptable ones. This is easier said than done. Thus,
the point of this paper is to evaluate several types of
justification given for decisions taken at the Dutch
headquarters of Médecins sans Frontières (MSF).
Since MSF is a leading medical and humanitarian
NGO that is well known both for its expertise and
its moral credibility, it seems reasonable to suppose
that such an evaluation might prove a fruitful con-
tribution to the discussion. Of course, the analysis
provided here is only a small gesture in the direction
of a full theory of NGO accountability to recipients
in need of medical care.
 
3
 
ABOUT MSF
 
MSF was founded in 1971, by several French doc-
tors formerly of the International Red Cross
(ICRC). They left the ICRC because they disagreed
with its policy of maintaining strict silence concern-
ing the forced starvation and migration that
occurred during the war in Biafra. They wanted to
be able to bear witness to the suffering of people,
and to denounce their inhumane treatment. Solidar-
ity with populations in danger is still one of the
guiding values of MSF, as are principles of political,
religious and economic independence, impartiality
and humanity. While they assert their moral right to
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The Sphere Project. 2004. 
 
The Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter
and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response.
 
 Geneva: The Sphere
Project. Available at: http://www.sphereproject.org/ [Accessed 3 Feb
2006].
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This second mechanism has been proposed by what is now known as
the ‘Humanitarian Accountability Project’. See A. Ebrahim. Account-
ability in Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs. 
 
World Development
 
 2003;
31: 821.
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A somewhat different version of this paper was printed for distribu-
tion within MSF in 2004. I also benefited from an opportunity to
present it at the Joint Centre for Bioethics (University of Toronto) in
April of that year.
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denounce human rights abuses wherever they occur,
and no matter who perpetrates them, they do not
‘take sides’ in a conflict situation. Instead, they treat
victims on the basis of need. As such, they are also
able to maintain a type of political neutrality in their
dealings with parties in armed conflict.
Since its founding, MSF has grown to be a very
large organization indeed. It has five operational
sections based in Europe (Holland, France, Spain,
Switzerland and Germany) and 13 partner sections
worldwide. In general, operational sections are
responsible for the actual design and implementa-
tion of projects, and partner sections focus their
efforts on recruiting and fund-raising.
 
4
 
 There is also
an organization called ‘MSF International’, which
is able to speak out on behalf  of all sections and acts
as a coordinating body.
The staff  of MSF includes medical personnel
(doctors, nurses, nutritionists, midwives, etc.) and
several other types of personnel who are responsi-
ble for everything from financial and logistical
matters to issues of human-rights advocacy and
humanitarian law. While part of their mandate is
the provision of humanitarian relief  in emergen-
cies, many of their relief  programs are converted
into long-term medical assistance projects after the
initial emergency has been addressed. These can
last for many years. MSF also intervenes in situa-
tions where the crisis is less acute, for instance, in
areas of chronic political instability or where peo-
ple are displaced for long periods of time. Typi-
cally, MSF works in areas of the developing world
where no health care infrastructure exists, or where
the existing infrastructure cannot adequately
address the current needs of the population. Their
regular activities include: mass vaccination cam-
paigns, therapeutic and supplementary nutrition,
distribution of drugs and supplies, surgery, the
development of water and sanitation systems, and
rehabilitation of health structures. At the time of
writing, MSF was working in 68 countries.
 
5
 
4
 
I should note, however, that this precise division of labour is currently
undergoing some changes since many partner sections have become
quite large and are the source of significant expertise.
 
5
 
More  information  on  specific  projects  can  be  found  at  any  one  of
the many MSF websites, including: http://www.msf.ca/; http://
www.msf.org.au/; http://www.msf.org/.
 
ABOUT THE RESEARCH PROJECT
 
I began a collaborative investigation surrounding
issues of ethics, principles and decision-making with
MSF-Holland (MSF-H) in 2002. At that time, I
spent several months in the field doing interviews,
examining documents, attending meetings and vis-
iting project sites. My observations took place
mainly at the Nairobi office and at two field projects
– one in Galcayo, Somalia, and another in Mandera,
Kenya. On the basis of this first stage of my
research, I produced a report that was subsequently
presented in brief  at MSF-H’s annual ‘Coordinator
Days’ conference in May of 2003.
 
6
 
Immediately following the conference, I spent
several weeks conducting additional research at
MSF-H’s head office in Amsterdam. At that time, I
conducted approximately 10 semi-structured inter-
views that were audiotaped and transcribed with the
consent of the participants. I was also assigned a
limited functional role in their Humanitarian
Affairs Department, in order to facilitate observa-
tion of the day-to-day activities of the office, and
attended several meetings as a participant observer.
Further, I attended some planning meetings where I
was simply an observer and did not take part.
Finally, I reviewed documents and reports from
their on-site library, which enabled me to get a sense
of how thinking about decision-making has changed
over time in MSF-H.
The qualitative data upon which the following
analysis is based was collected during this second
phase of my research, although my prior knowledge
of MSF-H was, of course, a useful background.
Each phase of the research was approved separately
by the research ethics committees of both the Uni-
versity of Toronto and MSF-H, and informed con-
sent was obtained from the participants. I took a
broadly grounded theory approach to analysis of
the data. I first attempted to identify some of the
key concepts used in discussions and reports con-
cerning resource allocation. I then subjected these
concepts to philosophical analysis, in an effort to
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See L. Fuller. 2003. 
 
Many Missions, One Voice: Justice and Integrity
in MSF Operational Choices.
 
 Amsterdam: MSF. The output of this first
visit was the above policy report in which I analyzed the meaning and
importance of MSF principles and their relation to practice.
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both clarify how these concepts and terms were
used, and to build them into a larger conceptual
framework. The three modes of justification ana-
lyzed below were found to be prevalent in the data
taken as a whole, and each also appeared in more
than one type of source (documents, interviews, and
observations). As such, it can safely be said that they
are recognized ways of reasoning within the organi-
zation, but also that they represent only 
 
some
 
 of  the
many justifications, arguments and views found
there.
 
7
 
Since my concern here is how headquarters-level
resource allocation decisions are taken and the types
of justifications that are given for them, it is neces-
sary to say a few words about MSF-H’s formal plan-
ning processes. Each year, a comprehensive set of
project proposals is submitted to headquarters.
These proposals are subject to review at the four-
month and eight-month marks. In the annual pro-
posals, each country manager submits budgets and
objectives for all the projects in his or her country
for the coming year. These budgets and objectives
can be substantially altered during the scheduled
reviews. In addition, other small budget allocations
or emergency projects can be approved at either the
weekly meetings of operational directors or, if  the
amount of money is small enough, on the sole
authority of the relevant operational director. Oper-
ational directors oversee several countries at once
and are answerable to the general director.
It is my understanding that each operational sec-
tion has its own mechanisms for taking decisions, so
the processes of other MSF sections will differ
somewhat from those discussed here. As such, while
the specific issues I raise should be taken to apply
to the Holland section directly, the broad implica-
tions of my analysis may also be relevant to other
MSF sections, and perhaps even to other NGOs that
administer health-service aid projects.
 
7
 
I would like to express my sincere thanks to all participants, as well
as to MSF-H’s Public Health Department for its role in facilitating this
research. In particular, I would like to thank Richard Bedell and Lucie
Blok for all their help and advice. Without their considerable support,
this project would not have been possible. I would also like to thank L.
Wayne Sumner for supporting my proposals to do field work, and my
reviewers for their helpful comments.
 
ANALYSIS
 
Within the decision-making processes of MSF-H,
justifications can take a variety of forms and repre-
sent several different interests or perspectives. The
focus of my analysis here is specifically those justi-
fications that are typically given for decisions to
open, close, or substantially revamp a project. From
my observations at both the field and headquarters
levels, as well as my conversations with staff, it has
become clear that these justifications can be divided
into three main types: appeals to population health
statistics, reference to the MSF mandate, and assur-
ances that they would advocate on the communities’
behalf. My main objective here is to provide an anal-
ysis of each of these from the point of view of fair-
ness. For each mode of justification, I first provide
a description of it, then raise some concerns about
it, and finally, make some suggestions about how
these concerns might be addressed.
But first, a word about justification. Why should
we care about justification? Why not focus instead
on the 
 
results
 
 of  projects, such as the number of lives
saved, vaccinations administered or the extent to
which morbidity has been reduced? Because, when
resources are limited, there is likely to be disagree-
ment about how to set priorities both within and
among projects. In order for the parties concerned
to accept such priority-setting, it is important for
them to recognize the decision-making process as
legitimate. This acceptance is made more likely by
the existence of a process that is both fair and trans-
parent. After all, when people care deeply about the
decisions being made, they cannot be expected to
readily cooperate with decisions that they view as
arbitrary or indefensible.
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A process of deliberation in which the reasons for
decisions taken are both 
 
available to all
 
 stakeholders
and 
 
rationally defended
 
 embodies what Norman
Daniels & James Sabin call ‘accountability for rea-
sonableness’.
 
9
 
 This is a more comprehensive notion
 
8
 
It ought to be noted that mechanisms of procedural fairness do not,
on their own, guarantee the production of a fair outcome in every case.
I recognize that such procedural mechanisms might benefit from addi-
tional substantive criteria that define what can count as an acceptable
outcome, thus eliminating at least the most obvious cases of unfairness.
I do not suggest any such criteria here, however.
 
9
 
N. Daniels & J. Sabin. 2002. 
 
Setting Limits Fairly.
 
 Oxford: Oxford
University Press: 44.
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of  accountability than either simple financial report-
ing or assurances of cost-effectiveness, in that it is
addressed to those people who may be adversely
affected by certain decisions. To be accountable for
reasonableness is to be accountable both to those
people who benefit from decisions and to those who
do not. This approach acknowledges that potential
recipients of aid have a vital interest in MSF’s deci-
sions, while at the same time accommodating the
fact that resources are limited and so not all suitable
populations can be benefited. Caring about justifi-
cation is, then, a way of caring about accountability
to beneficiaries. To a lesser extent, it is also a way to
build and protect the credibility of MSF-H, both in
the eyes of its own members and the public at large.
 
(I) POPULATION HEALTH 
JUSTIFICATIONS
 
Several medical personnel reported that they have
often given what they called ‘population health’ or
‘public health’ reasons for opening and closing
projects. Such justifications are formed on the basis
of population statistics, usually regarding a specific
outbreak of a specific disease. For instance, when the
statistical threshold which indicates that an out-
break is under control has been reached, this fact is
presented as a good reason for closing the project.
An MSF-er might argue thus: ‘We came here for the
outbreak, and we didn’t concern ourselves with any-
thing else. The outbreak is over, so we can leave. We
have seen a clear improvement, we have done what
we could do, and so the project is being closed’.
This type of ‘medical’ or ‘public health’ justi-
fication, when used with reference to a specific
outbreak, seems relatively straightforward and
unproblematic. This is because the value of the
project rests with its outcome – control of the out-
break. In this situation, any relationship that is
established with the communities is short-term and
almost purely instrumental in nature. The desired
end is what matters here.
By contrast, participants found this kind of justi-
fication for closing a project unsatisfactory when a
general health care program was at issue, despite
significant pressure to come up with medical reasons
for leaving. One participant noted that he didn’t feel
that he had committed to a particular disease, or to
a particular crisis, but rather, he said, ‘I committed
to helping people in this community’. Another par-
ticipant commented:
[A]s soon as you get involved in general health
care to the population and there is no good gov-
ernment system or any other private system to
take that over . . . it becomes much more difficult
to say, ‘Yes, but now it is no longer a big emer-
gency here and there are bigger emergencies
somewhere else in the world’. But what do you
base that [judgment] on, that there is a bigger
emergency somewhere else in the world? Often
that is more based on the fact that there is an
acute crisis there, and so what you are comparing
is an acute crisis with a chronic crisis.
The basic message here is that many MSF-ers feel
that if  a community still needs them, then they have
an obligation to stay. This sentiment was expressed
particularly strongly by medical personnel. But why
is this situation seen to entail a responsibility that is
not present in the first case? After all, in both cases
people were helped with their medical problems, and
in both cases we can assume that at least 
 
some
 
 peo-
ple were left who could have benefited from further
assistance.
The second case differs from the first in the source
of its value. In a program that consists of, or
includes, general health care for people who have
none, the value of the project is not exclusively in
the end(s) it is intended to bring about.
 
10
 
 Such
projects have intrinsic value as well, as one partici-
pant explained: ‘You are offering something to
them, you are offering hope, you are offering possi-
bilities of treatment and you can’t leave in the middle
of that’. Further, such projects express solidarity
with a population in crisis, as well as engendering a
relationship of trust between the community and
MSF-H.
 
11
 
Trust, hope, solidarity – these are all elements of
the relation MSF-H has with a given population
when its projects take on a more long-term and
general form. It is in this relation then, that we can
 
10
 
Of course, there is no doubt that such a project is also instrumentally
valuable.
 
11
 
For a much more in-depth discussion of the intrinsic goods embodied
by MSF projects, see Fuller, 
 
op. cit.
 
 note 6.
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locate the intrinsic value of the projects. In the philo-
sophical literature, such a relationship is typically
called ‘special’ since it identifies a relation between
two particular groups that does not obtain between
all human beings more generally. Importantly, such
special relations are often said to be the source of
special responsibilities as well. Samuel Scheffler
makes the claim that, ‘to attach non-instrumental
value to my relationship . . . just is, in part, to see
that person as a source of special claims’.
 
12
 
 Scheffler
unpacks this idea further by noting that to see some
person or group as a source of special claims is to
see their needs, interests and desires as ‘providing
me with presumptively decisive reasons for action,
reasons that I would not have had in the absence of
the relationship’.
 
13
 
 He also points out that some-
times special responsibilities can originate in ‘the
vulnerability created by the beneficiary’s trust in or
dependence on the bearer’.
 
14
 
 Either way, the result
of special responsibilities is that we view certain peo-
ple as being able to make special claims on us.
In essence, Scheffler is pointing out that our rela-
tions that have non-instrumental value require that
we 
 
give priority
 
 to the interests of the people with
whom we have them. This means that these reasons
will usually trump competing reasons unless the
others are very weighty indeed. If, for instance, the
same amount of good could be done in a project
elsewhere as in one where a relationship is already
established, Scheffler is pointing out that the latter
population would usually have the stronger claim.
On this view, giving priority to those people with
whom MSF-H is already engaged is part of what it
means to be genuinely committed to helping 
 
these
particular people
 
, and not just to the project of help-
ing more generally.
Scheffler’s explanation provides a nice account of
why many doctors and other field staff  were uncom-
fortable with leaving a population when they had
been providing the only general health care in the
region. They seem to have instinctively felt that they
had special obligations to the populations with
 
12
 
S. Scheffler. 2001. 
 
Boundaries and Allegiances
 
. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press: 100. The underlying assumption here is that relationships
of  solidarity  and  trust  have  intrinsic  value,  but  I  do  not  argue  for
that claim here, since such an argument would constitute a significant
digression.
 
13
 
Ibid: 100.
 
14
 
Ibid: 104.
 
which they were already engaged. Having begun
providing these services and having established a
relation of trust and solidarity with a certain popu-
lation, MSF-H has come to owe them 
 
something
extra
 
, which it does not owe to others.
In fact, from my observations of how decisions
were made at headquarters, it seemed that this intu-
ition was usually taken to be a decent guide as to how
to proceed. If  a project or country is already estab-
lished as a place where MSF-H is working, then the
presumption is that it will continue unless decisive
reasons can be provided for pulling out. While public
health statistics might provide such a decisive reason
in some instances, this is the case in only a small num-
ber of projects. As such, we can see that the popu-
lation health justification has limited applicability.
The problem with relying heavily on a special
obligations-type justification rather than a popula-
tion health one, is that the former is vulnerable to
what has been called ‘the distributive objection’.
Critics of special responsibilities worry that their
effect ‘may be to introduce injustice where there was
none before’.
 
15
 
 But how could this be so, if  such
responsibilities are generated by the value of the
relation? Doesn’t this value justify giving priority to
people with whom MSF-H has already engaged?
That  depends  on  the  perspective  one  takes  on
the problem. From the perspective of safeguarding
existing valuable relations, such a course of action
seems best. However, the distributive objection takes
what might be called a ‘comparative’ perspective. It
is concerned not just with values and obligations
that currently exist, but also with possible trade-offs
that might be undertaken. The objection can be
stated as follows:
[Special] responsibilities confer additional advan-
tages on people who have already benefited from
participating in rewarding groups and relation-
ships and . . . this is unjustifiable whenever the
provision of these additional advantages works to
the detriment of those who are needier, whether
they are needier because they are not themselves
participants in such rewarding groups or relation-
ships, or because they have significantly fewer
resources of other kinds.
 
16
 
15
 
Ibid: 92.
 
16
 
Ibid: 85.
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The concern is that having once been chosen to
receive benefits, by virtue of the relationship that is
subsequently developed, the same group is given
priority status and so is made consistently better off
than other comparable groups. This priority is said
to be unfair.
So, how might this kind of concern for fairness be
accommodated? If, as Scheffler asserts, it is not pos-
sible to ‘obtain the benefits of participating in . . .
relations without acquiring special responsibilities
in the process’, then any attempt to eliminate those
relationships in the name of fairness entails the sac-
rifice of significant goods – intrinsically valuable
ones.
 
17
 
 Therefore, it seems useful to look for other
ways in which to answer the distributive objection.
Scheffler himself  gestures at how this accommoda-
tion might be achieved; certain constraints could be
put on relations that generate partiality such that
third parties are less disadvantaged by them.
For this purpose, I would like to propose four
plausible constraints: (1) a constraint on the 
 
number
 
of  such relations within the overall activity of MSF-
H; (2) a constraint on their substantive 
 
content
 
; (3)
a 
 
legitimacy
 
 constraint, and finally; (4) a 
 
reassess-
ment
 
 constraint.
 
18
 
(1) The most obvious method by which to restrict
partiality in programming is to designate a portion
of the budget for new projects that will benefit pop-
ulations not currently served. This allows them an
ongoing opportunity to be considered for aid and
so makes it impossible that partiality will lock them
out altogether. Happily, MSF-H already does this
each year by planning for ‘an envelope of the
unplannable’. Especially with respect to emergen-
cies, MSF-H is committed to moving quickly into
new areas and new countries, and reflects this com-
mitment in its decision-making processes.
Of course, the central difficulty here is how to
ascertain the appropriate size of the ‘envelope’, rel-
ative to the overall size of the budget. It is my
understanding that within MSF-H, the budget
allocation for new, unplanned projects is already
substantial, and so is not merely a ‘contingency’
 
17
 
Ibid: 93.
 
18
 
Another very important constraint is MSF’s mandate or mission, but
this is recognized as such by MSF-er’s and so will be addressed in the
next section as its own mode of justification.
 
fund. While this practice is in line with a general
commitment to restraining partiality, perhaps a
more demanding (and instructive) way to formu-
late the problem is to ask: ‘How much can we legit-
imately set aside for those projects that are already
established?’
 
19
 
(2) The content constraint is, on its face, simply
an appeal to common sense. It can not be the case
that continued partiality to a population is war-
ranted if  no real advantages are accruing to them
as a result. In effect, the project must be meeting
some needs; it should be benefiting the population
in a substantial manner. Clearly some type of
threshold must be specified in order to determine
whether a given project is meeting this require-
ment. Just how much in the way of practical health
benefits are required in order for the continuation
of a particular project to be justified will depend
on what other justificatory arguments can be made
in its favour.
For instance, goods of an intrinsic nature should
not be disregarded when evaluating any particular
situation. It might be the case that some more lives
could be saved if  the funds from project 
 
A
 
 were
reallocated to project 
 
B
 
, but that in project 
 
A
 
 MSF-
H is making a statement of protest by remaining to
help this population when all other NGOs have
abandoned them. This type of protest has moral
value, and as such should count in favour of con-
tinuing project 
 
A
 
.
The content constraint is a reflection of the fact
that partiality is warranted by the values that it
makes possible. The mere fact that MSF-H has been
engaged with a given group of people for some time
does not, in itself, generate any special obligations
to them.
 
20
 
 Projects must meet some minimum
threshold of moral worth, usually by instantiating
some combination of intrinsic value and positive
health consequences for individuals.
 
21
 
(3) The legitimacy constraint rests on the idea of
reciprocity in relationships. In short, recipient pop-
ulations must wish to have MSF-H present in their
 
19
 
I owe this formulation of the problem to Nicholas Stockton.
 
20
 
It is worth noting here that simple non-abandonment might be a
good because it expresses solidarity. The importance or weight of this
will vary with the situation of the population.
 
21
 
The intrinsic value generated by a particular project could take the
form of acts of protest, compassion or non-abandonment, for instance.
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communities.
 
22
 
 Scheffler notes that in order to value
a relation non-instrumentally, it must be that I value
the relation of each individual or group to the
other.
 
23
 
 It can’t be the case that I value the status of
MSF-H as a provider of certain goods but do not
care who receives them or whether the recipients
also value those goods. In the situation where other
populations could benefit greatly from being chosen
for aid, it seems illegitimate to be partial to ones that
are either indifferent or hostile to MSF-H’s pres-
ence. This is the case because the partiality origi-
nates in the value of the relation between MSF-H
and the population. By definition then, if  one party
sees the relation as valueless (or even as having neg-
ative value), then the relation no longer exists as a
source of special obligations. It does not have to be
the case that members of the population say explic-
itly: ‘We want you out’, although this could be the
situation. It is enough that no one in the relevant
community cares one way or the other whether
MSF-H stays or goes.
(4) The idea of a reassessment constraint might
seem a little redundant given the extensive, ongoing
evaluation of programs typical of MSF-H. However,
from my observations at headquarters, it emerged
that many of the reviews or decision-making forums
are in fact approving changes that are already a 
 
fait
accompli
 
 before they are considered. This makes a
good deal of sense from an efficiency point of view,
since changes to projects would be considerably
delayed if  they had to accommodate headquarters’
schedule at every turn. Still, I was struck by the
comment that it’s never true that, ‘everything is off
the table, and we’ve got to start from scratch’. In my
view, this betrays too deep an acceptance of the fact
of partiality, even when it is open to the people
involved to call existing projects into question if  they
wish.
From the perspective of third parties who might
potentially benefit from less partiality, it would be
fairer to deliberately call into question every project
(or perhaps country) on some kind of regular,
 
22
 
Of course, it is not always easy to determine exactly whose opinion
represents the view of the community. Certainly the opinions of author-
ity figures should not be the only ones considered. At the very least, the
people most affected by the presence of MSF should place some value
on their efforts.
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rotating basis.
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 This would mean that at scheduled
intervals MSF-H’s presence in a given country
would be thrown into question and people would
have to make a case for it ‘from scratch’. If  their
presence in a given country were approved anew on
this basis, then the ongoing nature of the relation-
ship surely would add more weight to that verdict.
If  it turned out that MSF-H’s presence there was
borderline or was rejected, then factors about the
historical relation between MSF-H and that popu-
lation might be brought up as part of an appeal, or
counter-argument. Depending on the case, the his-
torical relationship might be enough to tip the scale
in the direction of approval, or it might not.
This constraint is a suggestion about how to level
the playing field in favour of those populations not
currently part of MSF-H’s portfolio. Having inter-
mittent evaluations of this radical sort would elimi-
nate the dependence in the present system on the
willingness of certain individuals to question partic-
ular commitments. After all, any particular individ-
ual’s willingness to question is dependent on many
contingent factors, such as workload, assertiveness,
and personal attachment. As such, their failure to
raise concerns may not reflect their reasoned opin-
ions, and so introduces an undesirable element of
arbitrariness.
 
(II) MANDATE-BASED JUSTIFICATIONS
 
Among the MSF-ers with whom I spoke, the most
recognized constraint on the choice of activities and
populations was the mandate. While MSF’s man-
date, or ‘mission’, is not a rigidly interpreted set of
requirements, it is seen by most people to have both
ascertainable boundaries and significant weight. As
such, it is often cited as the justification for ruling
out certain activities or populations as appropriate
for MSF-H involvement. One participant explained
that for MSF-H to begin a program in a given loca-
tion, ‘it has to have this combination of humanitar-
ian and medical crisis’. At least for the purposes of
new projects, it is not enough that there are medical
needs – there also must be a natural or social
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This is, admittedly, merely a slightly more radical version of what
already goes on.
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upheaval of some sort that is making certain people
more vulnerable than they would otherwise be. Fur-
ther, since MSF is both a medical organization and
an emergency organization, these ideas are also cen-
tral parts of the mandate and so serve to delineate
MSF-H’s sphere of action. When asked why they
will not set up a project or undertake a particular
activity,  the  answer  can  (sometimes)  simply  be
that ‘It is not in line with who we are’. Answers of
this form are what I am calling ‘mandate-based
justifications’.
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The amount and source of the mandate’s flexibil-
ity are what make it an interesting – if  sometimes
problematic – type of justification. I have argued
elsewhere that only if  changes in interpretation are
made on principle, and for the long term, can the
mandate survive as a legitimate source of justifica-
tion.
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 This is because the mandate is meant to direct
MSF-H’s efforts toward the realization of certain
goods, and so its use as a constraint on activities is
only reasonable if  it actually realizes those goods
over the long term.
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 Arbitrary or unprincipled
changes in the way the mandate is construed can
undermine the validity of this type of argument.
This is because only consistent application of this
constraint can show it to be procedurally fair.
Still, this does not mean that interpretation of the
mandate cannot change over time, although such
changes do represent a challenge for fairness. Both
Ronald Dworkin and Norman Daniels argue that it
is possible to take a ‘case law’ approach to past
policy decisions while still retaining the ability to
make innovative changes. This approach rests on
two fundamental premises: (1) ‘a presumption that
the earlier, reason-based deliberation will be applied
to similar cases in the present’; (2) the claim that
‘respect for past commitments . . . does not mean
that past errors of judgments cannot be corrected
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A note about the word ‘mandate’. Officially, MSF doesn’t have a
rigidly defined, written mandate. They prefer not to because this allows
for more flexibility and growth. However, having an informal mandate
or mission of this kind only makes the problem of how it can function
as a constraint or justification more acute, rather than less.
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The fact that these goods have substantive value is what justifies
directing action towards their realization in the first place. Their value
is a sufficient reason to choose them, since it is unreasonable to expect
that any organization will be able to take on all the goods that would
be worthwhile pursuing.
 
by new deliberation’.
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 These two premises can be
understood to give weight to both the ‘history’ and
‘integrity’ of the process.
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 The first recognizes the
basic requirement of procedural fairness that like
cases should be treated alike, while the second
acknowledges that substantive moral considerations
may require past mistakes to be corrected. This
approach requires that changes in the interpretation
of the mandate be backed up by moral reasons, since
this also changes which populations and activities
will fall under it. Daniels & Sabin explain:
[The] case law [approach] does not imply past
infallibility, but it does imply giving careful con-
sideration to why earlier decision-makers made
the choices they did. Since treating a new case
differently from a (similar) old one thus involves
acknowledging a change and perhaps an earlier
error in policy, the case law model demands a
clear rationale and a new avowal of principles and
commitments  in  order  to  avoid  the  appearance
of inconsistency or deliberate unfairness in
treatment.
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The mandate is not shaped exclusively by internal
mechanisms and concerns. It is also sensitive to
moral demands coming from outside. This type of
sensitivity tends toward the improvement of the
mandate as a justifiable constraint, since it can be
adjusted to address substantive moral concerns that
present themselves at the field level. One such
change in mandate seems to have occurred with
respect to differentiating exit and entry criteria. One
participant noted that a combined humanitarian
and medical crisis used to be seen as both an 
 
entry
 
and an 
 
exit
 
 criterion. However, it was noted that this
‘doesn’t feel right especially for the medical people’.
As a result, the policy had been changed by 2003
such that, as one participant put it, ‘if  there is still
a medical crisis, even though the humanitarian crisis
may have resolved, we will not just leave it like that’.
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Daniels & Sabin, 
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 note 9, p. 48.
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‘History’ and ‘integrity’ are Dworkin’s terms, rather than Daniels’
(see Ronald Dworkin. 1986. 
 
Law’s Empire
 
. Cambridge, MA: Belknap
Press.) However, they are a nice shorthand way of referring to the two
elements of justice which both philosophers are concerned to incorpo-
rate into decision-making, namely, procedural justice and substantively
just outcomes.
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It appears from the above example that organiza-
tions cannot be the ‘supreme gatekeepers of [their]
own identities’.
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 Although we may choose to begin
or end certain relations, it is not always up to us
what moral significance they take on. Scheffler notes
that relationships have a strong ‘influence [on] the
ways that we are seen by both ourselves and
others’.
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 This is an advantage from the point of
view of accountability. Having a mandate that is
sensitive to relevant outside factors helps counter
the objection that mandates are too inward looking
to act as a justifiable reason for choosing some pop-
ulations and not others.
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 Making room for the con-
tinual revision and re-shaping of the mandate in
light of new concerns is a way to answer this objec-
tion, by demonstrating that the mandate is actually
a ‘middle-way’ between the priorities set by the
organization and those demanded by the needs and
circumstances of the recipients.
(III) ADVOCACY-BASED JUSTIFICATIONS
The third type of justificatory argument frequently
cited by participants was ‘the advocacy justifica-
tion’. This argument was used to support projects
meant to demonstrate that certain treatments can be
successfully delivered in difficult or unusual settings.
It can be the case in these projects that only a few
people are provided with extensive treatment, while
others receive virtually none. These are sometimes
called ‘vertical’ programs, and generally address
31 Scheffler, op. cit. note 12, p. 107.
32 Ibid: 106.
33 The idea that the mandate can and should be constrained by factors
outside the organization might seem unusual or objectionable to some.
It is often thought that the giver of ‘charity’ is free to decide to whom
s/he will give, how much, and when. This approach seems unduly dis-
missive of the interests of recipients since it suggests that they are not
entitled to a say in actions that greatly affect them. Indeed, for similar
reasons this prevalent view also does not express sufficient respect for
the beneficiaries as the moral equals of the NGO decision-makers.
Finally, it is important to note a significant difference between the case
of the isolated, private giver and the situation of an NGO. It seems
much more plausible to argue that ‘if  you are in the ongoing business
of providing aid, then you ought to do so in an accountable and ethi-
cally justifiable manner’ than it is to argue that private individuals ought
to be held to such standards (although perhaps this argument could be
made). The institutional character of NGOs, coupled with the signifi-
cant effects they have on a large number of people provide presumptive
reasons in favour of more stringent ethical requirements for them.
complex diseases such as, for example, multi-drug
resistant tuberculosis. This model was characterized
by one participant as, providing: ‘Cadillacs for some
[patients, instead of] bicycles for all’.
The advocacy justification runs, roughly, as fol-
lows: ‘In this project we are setting an example by
demonstrating that such-and-such a treatment can
be successfully carried out in a resource-poor set-
ting. On this basis we will then advocate for the
Ministry of Health (MoH) and/or other agencies
and political actors to stop neglecting their respon-
sibilities with respect to people afflicted with this
type of ailment’. While this is a very worthwhile
thing to do in principle, one participant wondered,
‘[i]f  these projects do not have advocacy conse-
quences, are they really justified?’ This is a worry
about whether providing treatment for only a few
people who have complex diseases – in a context in
which many others have no access to treatment at
all – is morally justifiable unless it results in a lot
more good consequences in the long run. If, as peo-
ple hope, the government or MoH takes up the new
treatment, and so results in good outcomes for many
more members of the population, then the original
vertical program appears to be justified. If, as often
happens, the treatment is not taken up and applied
on a larger scale, then it seems like using so many
resources to treat only a few people was simply
unfair.
Obviously one of the key problems here is uncer-
tainty about future consequences. Unfortunately,
moral decisions and evaluations are typically made
under  uncertain  conditions  and  so  this  does not
do much to alleviate people’s moral concerns.34 To
avoid this problem, we, as agents, often strive to
make decisions that mitigate the negative effects of
uncertainty on the overall value of the action.
How do we do this? We undertake actions that
have a number of different valuable aspects. For
instance, in evaluating vertical programs, several dif-
ferent values ought to be considered. First, if  the
project is genuinely groundbreaking from a scientific
point of view, then this has value independently of
34 Unless, of course, certain consequences were altogether unforesee-
able, and then we do no typically hold anyone responsible for them. We
do, however, still take into account the degree of uncertainty people
were facing when they made the decision, and evaluate whether or not
it was a wise one under the circumstances.
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whether more members of the population are sub-
sequently treated. Also, the fact that MSF-H has
demonstrated the feasibility of a new treatment
reveals that the MoH (or other responsible parties)
could be helping these people but simply will not.
This has value as an act of moral protest and soli-
darity with the people who continue to suffer need-
lessly. These considerations can go some distance
toward justifying certain kinds of vertical projects
even when it is uncertain whether or not other good
health outcomes for individuals will result in the
long term.
Nevertheless, it may be the case that strictly ver-
tical programs are always a problem for fairness.
When there is a high prevalence of common diseases
in the population that are easy and inexpensive to
treat, equity does seem to demand that they be
addressed somehow. Pairing each vertical program
with a general health care unit would go a long way
to satisfying the demands of equity while retaining
the other benefits of these projects. In this situation,
it would never be the case that uncertainty about the
future impacted severely on MSF-H’s ability to jus-
tify its activities in retrospect.
CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING INDIVIDUAL 
AND INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES
We have seen that within MSF-H justifications serve
a variety of purposes. Justifications are made by
individuals to beneficiaries, by individuals to other
MSF members (including members of other opera-
tional sections), and sometimes even by individuals
to themselves. Furthermore, the activity of giving
justifications takes place within an institutional
framework that serves two functions. First, it is the
source of demands upon individuals to give reasons
and arguments. It determines when and how such
arguments will be given, and provides decision-
makers with an opportunity to discuss and consider
their merits. Second, the institutional framework
itself  can be structured such that it facilitates
fairness in resource allocation. Headquarters level
procedures can greatly contribute to the overall jus-
tifiability and legitimacy of the organization, if  they
are oriented toward balancing current commitments
with other potential commitments.
One way to understand how the decision-making
process can achieve this balance, is to think of it as
embodying two distinct perspectives simultaneously
– the ‘comparative’ and the ‘relational’. The com-
parative perspective is both impersonal and im-
partial, in that it abstracts from any concrete
relationships MSF-H might have and focuses
instead on factors such as the level of need present
in the populations and the likelihood of securing
good outcomes for them. It is also sensitive to the
distribution of  good consequences among the pool
of potential and actual beneficiaries (recall that the
comparative perspective is taken by the distributive
objection mentioned earlier). The ‘relational’ per-
spective is the perspective of people who have estab-
lished a significant relation with a given community.
Here, justification is understood as the concrete
practice of giving reasons for project decisions
directly to recipients, and listening to their objec-
tions. From this perspective, it is no longer open as
a justificatory strategy to compare the needs or cir-
cumstances of this particular group with some other
group in an impersonal manner. Only reasons spe-
cific to their context and MSF-H’s concrete capaci-
ties are likely to be found acceptable at this level.
This is because decisions regarding jointly-held
goods such as trust and cooperation are only likely
to be viewed as legitimate if  all concerned parties are
treated equitably – that is, given a voice and an
opportunity to raise concerns.
Indeed, the division between field and headquar-
ters staff  seems ideally suited to embodying these
two perspectives. However, since most people at
headquarters have extensive field experience (and so
are extremely sympathetic to that point of view),
some adjustment in outlook might need to be made
on their part in order to make the system as a whole
more fair.35
Field staff  are in the best position to argue from
the relational perspective. They have the necessary
knowledge and experience with particular commu-
nities to assess the degree of dependence, trust,
cooperation and vulnerability present within them.
As  such,  they  will  be  able  to  articulate  reasons
35 While this division of labour between field and headquarters might
be a bit artificial, it does seem to have some intuitive appeal. Clearly
though, what is important is that both perspectives ultimately be rep-
resented in the decision-making process.
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why special obligations obtain, and what might be
required to fulfill them. Field staff  are also the peo-
ple who ultimately have to give explanations to
beneficiaries when changes or closures are going to
be instituted. Since this is quite a heavy burden, they
should be able to demand justifications from head-
quarters that they can understand and can feel sat-
isfied giving on behalf  of the whole organization. By
making this type of demand, they are standing up
for the interests of those particular beneficiaries, and
also reassuring themselves that the strategy being
implemented is not simply arbitrary – both of which
are desirable activities from the point of view of
ethical reasoning. With the exception of security
concerns, there does not seem to be any reason why
field staff  should have to work on the assumption
that, as one participant put it: ‘maybe headquarters
knows better why the choice was made’. For that
matter, the practice of giving genuine and acceptable
reasons for a change in policy to recipients is a
fundamental aspect of treating them with respect,
and so such reasons should be demanded by staff
on that basis also.
By contrast, it is up to decision-makers at head-
quarters to put a structure in place that takes the
concerns of the comparative perspective into
account. This can be achieved by taking up a ‘third-
party’ viewpoint, or that of other potential
beneficiaries. I have suggested that the interests
represented by this standpoint might be best served
by instituting a set of constraints on the relational
perspective – by constricting the scope of allowable
partiality to current commitments.
This could be achieved in a number of ways. For
instance, headquarters can act (and already does) as
the final arbiter on issues of expanding or reinter-
preting the mandate, which in turn, requires people
in the field to make their arguments compatible with
it.36 If  these revisions were undertaken with an eye
to representing the interests of communities not yet
served, it could be a very effective mechanism for
36 Of course, this needs to be done in conjunction with other MSF
sections as well.
counter-balancing the tendency to privilege current
commitments. Additionally, I have suggested several
other constraints: (1) allotting a certain amount of
funds for the needs of new populations such that
existing entitlements do not shut out other groups;
(2) evaluating the content of programs in a sophis-
ticated manner in order to ensure that the priority
they are given is based on the real values they instan-
tiate; (3) instituting some kind of review process that
does not take existing commitments for granted but
rather subjects them to radical questioning on a
periodic basis.
While these types of measures do not eliminate
the priority that seems to be routinely given to estab-
lished programs, they would act as a kind of check
on it. In any case, it does not seem appropriate to
take the comparative perspective at all times, and so
what is needed is a kind of balance of those respon-
sibilities engendered by special relationships and
those obligations owed to people in general. If  each
perspective were taken up and defended vigorously,
then  the  result  should  be  an  acceptable  compro-
mise between conflicting obligations. As Thomas
Christiano writes:
[J]ustice strikes an appropriate balance between
the interests of individuals when they conflict. It
gives each person a claim to his or her share . . .
The appropriate balance between these conflict-
ing interests is given by the idea of equal consid-
eration of interests.37
Dividing up responsibility for advancing claims aris-
ing from the comparative and relational perspectives
allows for the important interests of both current
and potential beneficiaries to be considered equita-
bly. The compromise that will likely result from such
a process will be backed up by reasons and will
reflect a concern for both particular commitments
and overall fairness. This, in turn, will strengthen
MSF-H’s credibility as an organization committed
to both impartiality and to expressing solidarity
with populations in danger.
37 T. Christiano. Knowledge and Power in the Justification of Democ-
racy. Australas J Philos 2001; 79: 202.
